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ABSTRACT
Mobile Crowdsourcing System is an emerging service paradigm
base on numerous personal smart devices, where the Device-
to-Device communication among opportunistically encoun-
tered participating devices is an indispensable part of task
allocation, le transmission and data collaboration. Consid-
ering that participating devices are privately held and oppor-
tunistically encountered, we design the Trustworthy Device
Pairing (TDP) scheme that realizes user-transparent sharing
secret key negotiation and reliable peer device determina-
tion for trustworthy spontaneous D2D transactions. TDP is
demonstrated to be eective based on our proof-of-concept
implementation, and a further evaluation on eciency will
be conducted.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices with enriched sensing capabilities stimu-
late the proliferation of mobile crowdsourcing systems (MCSs),
an ubiquitous, heterogenous and smart service paradigm
that aims to provide data collecting, processing and com-
puting services, by exploiting the capacities of ubiquitous
personal mobile devices in a collaborative way [1].
The emerging Device-to-Device (D2D) communication tech-
niques [2] such as WiFi Direct, Bluetooth Smart, and LTE
direct have a great potential to provide cost-eective solu-
tions to collaborative interactions among mobile devices for
mobile crowdsourcing [3, 4]. However, since participating
devices are private and temporarily hired, there is no prior
trust relationship between devices opportunistically encoun-
tered. The initial trust establishment, or Device Pairing,
cannot rely on physical interactions between unfamiliar de-
vice holders. Furthermore, considering the high device den-
sity, there is no reference to determinate a proper peer device
among multiple available candidates.
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In this paper, we propose a mechanism, TDP, for oppor-
tunistically encountered devices in MCSs to autonomously
establish a secure D2D connection transparently to device
holders. Moreover, trustworthy peer device is determined
based on the device trust value reecting the reliability on
fullling dierent types of D2D transactions. Specically:
 TDP realizes user-transparent device paring that is not
supported by o-the-shelf protocols [5,6] and rapid de-
vice paring that is faster than state-of-art non-interactive
device pairing schemes [7{9], and device trustworthy is
novelly adopted for the determination of the most re-
liable D2D peer device.
 TDP guarantees a comparable security intensity as o-
the-shelf device pairing protocols [5,6] while taking ac-
count of trac oriented attacks, like the Trust Forging
Attack and the Collusive Attack manipulating D2D
trac, that are exclusive for D2D communications in
MCSs.
2. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
An MCS, see Fig.1(a), is generally composed of a Backend
Server (BS) and numerous participating devices (A,B,...,N).
Specically, BS formulates service campaigns, publishes crowd-
sourcing applications, outsources computing and sensing tasks,
manages feedback and maintains device proles. On the
other hand, any personal smart device that has installed the
crowdsourcing application and registered at BS becomes a
potential contributor to crowdsourcing tasks. Devices com-
municate with BS through wireless access of the Internet,
like WiFi or cellular access points, meanwhile they commu-
nicate with each other in a D2D manner through outband
wireless channels, like Bluetooth or WiFi Direct connections.
Based on the crowdsourcing application installed on par-
ticipating devices, BS outsources crowdcomputing tasks in-
tending to ooad computing or processing intensities and
crowdsensing tasks intending to spontaneously collect envi-
ronmental or social status data. Accepting allocated tasks,
participating devices need to establish D2D connections with
opportunistically encountered peers to recruit collaborators,
exchange intermediate processing results, or forward sensing
data packets.
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Figure 1: Architecture of TDP
3. TRUSTWORTHY DEVICE PAIRING
Considering issues discussed in Section 1, we design the
Trustworthy Device Pairing (TDP) scheme to realize oppor-
tunistic D2D communications and the D2D trust manage-
ment in MCSs. Specically, it has three major components:
Device Registration, Device Pairing, and Device Trustvalue
Management, whose general procedure is illustrated in Fig.1
3.1 Device Registration
In our design, device pairing credentials are generated and
managed within a Certicateless Public Key Cryptography
(CL-PKC) framework [10], where an authenticated key pair
composed of a private key and a public key (sk; pk) is uti-
lized for device authentication and sharing secret negotia-
tion. Under CL-PKC settings, the Computational Die-
Hellman Problem on the Elliptic Curves [11] is treated as
an intractable mathematical problem.
For the system initialization, BS setups security parame-
ters according to system scale, like expected user amount,
server capacities, and types of provided services. An elliptic
curve E and the master key pair (x; Ppub) of BS is generated,
where E and Ppub are predeployed into our crowdsourcing
application.
Any personal smart device, says A, that has installed the
application becomes a potential crowdsourcing task contrib-
utor. To get its D2D credential, A needs to register at BS.
The secret and public key pair of A (ska; pka) is coopera-
tively generated by A and BS, where parts of ska and pka
are locally generated by A and the rest of them is gener-
ated by BS based on the received public key part of A using
the master secret key x. Such a cooperative means guar-
antees that BS is not able to decrypt D2D trac between
any arbitrary pair of encountered devices since it does not
have any entire key pair, while, generated using the master
secret key x, any valid key pair itself can be treated as an
authenticated certicate for mutual authentication between
opportunistically encountered devices.
3.2 Device Pairing
The determination of a proper peer when there are mul-
tiple options will be explicitly discussed in the next section.
Without loss of generality, when determines to conduct a
D2D transaction with registered device B, registered device
A will initiate the Device Pairing process in Fig.1(b).
With the public key of peer device in the probe packet,
A and B will respectively generate a partial sharing secret
Va(b) based on their own private key ska(b), the other's pub-
lic key pkb(a) and the main public key Ppub. Since the partial
sharing secret based on one's public key can only be veri-
ed using corresponding private key, and valid public keys
of registered devices can be authenticated using the main
public key, A and B are able to restore the partial sharing
secret of their peer device V 0b(a).
The nal sharing secret Sab = Va  V 0b = V 0a  Vb can be
authenticated using general Challenge-Response schemes. If
Sab is successfully established, then we say A and B are
mutually authenticated, and Sab is treated as the session
key of the current D2D transaction.
3.3 Device Trustvalue Management
In our design, we use behaviors in previous D2D trans-
actions to evaluate the reliability of device fullling future
transactions, which is regarded as the criterion of the peer
device determination when there are multiple D2D options.
We dene such a reliability as Device Trustvalue t(IDa; i),
which is an n-dimension vector with the value of each dimen-
sion representing the reliability of device A fullling corre-
sponding type of D2D transaction dened by BS after its
i'th transaction. t(IDa; i) can be calculated as
t(IDa; i) =
2

arctan(tan(

2
t(IDa; i  1)) + t); (1)
where t is dened as
t = S  Cre  tv; (2)
where S is the feedback A received in its ith D2D transac-
tion, tv is an n-dimension vector that represent the weight
of such a transaction, and Cre is A's condence level on S,
which is dened as
Cre = Div + (1  )Sim; (3)
where Div denotes the relative diversity of devices that A
and its peer have paired with before, Sim denotes the sim-
ilarity of feedback that respectively from A and its peer to
devices that both of them have paired with before. Both
of them can be retrieved from device pairing histories that
record previous feedback to those paired devices.  2 (0; 1)
is the weight adjustment coecient. The meaning of Div
and Sim is to prevent potential adversaries from forging
their own trustvalues or collusively enhancing each other's
trustvalue within a group to manipulate D2D trac.
With such a denition of device trustvalue, according to
Fig.1(c), a participating device, says A, will cooperatively
generate a D2D transaction receipt Re with its peer device,
says B, to record feedback, credibility and transaction vector
for a trustvalue adjustment at BS. Such a receipt is, and only
is, veriable to A, B and BS using their private keys, while
the obfuscated feedback is veriable to the receiver without
revealing its actual value.
For participating devices, the trustvalue adjustment is
delay-tolerant, which is only performed when there is an
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Figure 2: Implementation of BS
economical access to the Internet. BS is responsible for the
verication of D2D receipts and the adjustment of trustval-
ues, after which it will generate a corresponding digital sig-
nature of the adjusted trustvalue for its future D2D paring
authentication.
4. IMPLEMENTATION
We implement a Proof-of-Concept version of device regis-
tration and pairing functionalities on a prototype consisting
of a BS based on Window7 workstation and two Android
smart devices (Google Nexus7 with Android L and Sam-
sung Galaxy Note3 with Andorid 4.3 Jelly Bean) with Blue-
tooth V4.0 modules, where our implementation is running
as a security service upon a rapid insecure Bluetooth con-
nection [12].
With cryptography primitives introduced by [13] and ECC
parameters adopted from secp160r1 [14], device registration
and pairing functionalities are realized, as shown in Fig.2
and 3. D2D credentials sk = (x; d), pk = (P;R) are cooper-
atively generated by BS and the participating device. After
the registration, device is able to start the crowdsourcing
service that allows user-transparent pairing with other reg-
istered device encountered, and the D2D session key SK will
be negotiated and authenticated based on D2D credentials.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we presented TDP focusing on trustwor-
thy device pairing for opportunistic D2D communications in
MCSs. We realized a user-transparent device pairing scheme
to establish sharing keys securing D2D transactions between
encountered devices, then proposed a device trust manage-
ment mechanism to evaluate the reliability of encountered
devices fullling pending D2D transactions. Based on our
implementation, TDP is demonstrated to be eective for
MCSs.
In future, we will extend our paring scheme to WiFi Direct
communications for a higher bandwidth, and further eval-
uate the performance of our trust management mechanism
with both OMNeT++ simulations and voluntary participat-
ing experiments in real campus environments. Additional
factors we emphasize during the evaluation include partici-
pator mobility modeling and crowdsourcing task/D2D trans-
action modeling.
Figure 3: Device Registration and Pairing
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